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This paper look at why most migration ﬂows include observable
jumps, a phenomenon that is in line with migration irreversibility.
We have presented a real option model where the migration choice
depends on both the wage diﬀerential between the host country and
the country of origin, and on the probability of full integration into the
host country. The optimal migration decision of an individual consists
of waiting to migrate in a (coordinated) mass of individuals. The size
of the migration ﬂow depends on the behavioural characteristics of
the ethnic groups: the more "sociable" they are, the larger the wave
and the lower the wage diﬀerential required. The second part of the
paper is devoted to calibrating the model and simulating migration
ﬂows into Italy over the last decade. The calibration can replicate
the migration jumps in the short term. In particular, the calibrated
model is able to project the induced labour demand elasticity level of
the host country and the behavioural rationale of the migrants.
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11 Introduction
Much economic research deals with mass migration inﬂow, observing that
migration dynamics are in general characterised by gradual waves at the be-
ginning of their processes, followed by suddenly increasing migration rates
(so-called "migration jumps" or "mass immigration") and then again by con-
stant entry rates. Thus, Angrist and Kugler (2003), using descriptive statis-
tics by Eurostat labour force surveys for 18 EU and other EEA countries,
observed that the late 1980s and early 1990s witnessed a "marked upturn".
Moretti (1999), studying Italian migration in the United States and Canada,
between 1876 and 1913, highlighted a sharp increase in the migration ﬂow
after 1900. A remarkable surge in immigration was also observable in the
United States (Ottaviano and Peri, 2005; Peri, 2006; Massey, 1995), in the
UK (Jackman and Savouri, 1992), in France (Thierry and Rogers, 2004) and
in Europe (Maillat, 1986)1. What could be the causes of these particular dy-
namics? The aim of our work was to try to answer this question by searching
for an endogenous explanation of migration jumps. We therefore developed
a model that merges the real option approach of investment decision ap-
plied to migration choice and the works on migration networks into a single
framework.
I nt h ee c o n o m i cl i t e r a t u r e ,t h em a i nv a r i a b l et h a ta ﬀects the magration
d e c i s i o ni st h ew a g ed i ﬀerential between the host country and the country
of origin (Todaro, 1969; Langley, 1974; Hart, 1975; Borjas, 1990, 1994).
Nevertheless, even if the wage diﬀerential is important, it is not suﬃcient
to totally explain migrant behaviour. Evidence seems to stress the focal
role of community networks in the migrant’s choice (Boyd, 1989; Bauer and
Zimmermann, 1997; Winters et al., 2001; Bauer et al., 2002; Coniglio, 2003;
Munshi, 2001, 2003; Heitmueller, 2003). Moretti (1999), for example, with
an alternative model to Todaro’s, found evidence that both the timing and
the destination of migration could be explained by the presence of social
networks in the host country.
Furthermore, the fact that the migration decision is in many cases at
least partially irreversible, is a third element that may help to explain the
presence of jumps in the migration ﬂows. In this respect, Burda (1995),
following a real option approach, implemented Sjaastad’s assumption (1962)
that describes migration choice in terms of investment. Burda showed that
individuals prefer to wait before migrating, even if the present value of the
wage diﬀerential is positive, because of the uncertainty and the sunk costs
associated with migration 2. Subsequently Khwaja (2002) and Anam et al.,
1The same evidence is found in Friedberg (2001), Hatton and Williamson (2006), Ped-
ersen et al. (2004) and Hartog and Winkelmann (2003).
2Investment is deﬁned as the act of incurring an immediate cost in the expectation of
future payoﬀ. However, when the immediate cost is sunk (at least partially) and there
is uncertainty over future rewards, the timing of the investment decision becomes crucial
(Dixit and Pindyck, 1994, p. 3).
2(2004) developed Burda’s approach by describing the role of uncertainty in
the migration decision. Another work that uses real option in migration is
Feist (1998), in which the author analyses the option value of the low-skilled
workers to escape to the unoﬃcial sector if welfare beneﬁts come too close
to the net wage in the oﬃcial sector.
Assimilating the decision of each individual to migrate to a new country
as a decision on an irreversible investment, we investigated the role played by
social networks to help immigrants integrate into the host country, where an
immigrant is completely integrated when his/her economic and social status
is no diﬀerent from the natives’ status in the host country. We did this
by considering the opportunity that each immigrant becomes a member of
a network (a community) of homogeneous individuals, located in the host
country. The community helps the immigrants to obtain a higher wage or
i m p r o v et h e i rw o r k i n gc o n d i t i o n si ft h e r ea r es t r o n gt i e sa m o n gt h em e m b e r s
("positive network externalities"). The larger the community, the higher the
number of ties, the higher the ﬂow of information on job opportunities, and
therefore the higher the probability of integrating.
Nevertheless, if the number of immigrants continues to increase, labour
competition as well as higher alienation3 among immigrants inside the com-
munity may reduce their net beneﬁts ("negative network externalities").
The struggle between these two forces is shown by an inverted U-shaped
beneﬁt function which follows directly by modelling the probability of each
immigrant being totally integrated in to the host country àl aBass (1969)4.
T h eB a s sm o d e l 5 describes the "behavioural rationale" of migration ﬂows well
by focusing on the role played by two kinds of immigrants: the innovators or
individualists, and the imitators. The innovators are those individuals that
decide to migrate independent of the decisions of others. The imitators are
those individuals inﬂuenced by the number of previous migrants: they share
information and tend to establish a network. The weight of each diﬀerent
type of immigrant inﬂuences the timing of migration and then the size of the
3This is the case in which the members of the incumbent population discontinue their
attraction of immigrants (see Heitmueller (2003)).
4From a theoretical point of view, an U-shaped beneﬁt function can be derived as
combination of a "herd behaviour" and a network eﬀect (see Bauer et al., 2002) or as an
application of the theory of clubs (see Vergalli, 2005).
5The Bass model was originally built to study the diﬀusion of new durable products
and largely adopted in marketing literature.
3community6.
On the one hand, the more the ties among individuals, the larger the
wave. On the other hand, the presence of congestion in the community
and/or strong competition among workers in the host country delays entry7.
Finally, we calibrated the model and simulated some migration ﬂows into
Italy in the period 1994-2000 by using the oﬃcial national statistic database
(ISTAT). The results ﬁt the theoretical approach and replicate the observable
migration jumps.
1.1 Some supporting evidence
Table 1 shows the average growth rates of certain immigration inﬂow into ﬁve
European countries (Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK)
for diﬀerent periods. The data for Germany were taken from the Statistisches
Bundesamt (Federal Statistical Oﬃce); for the Netherlands from the Statis-
tics Netherlands (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek); for Sweden from the
Statistics Sweden (Statistiska Centralbyrån) and for the UK from the Home
Oﬃce, the British government. For Italy, the data were taken from from the
ISTAT database8 for the years between 1994 and 2000 and from the Cari-
6The distinction between innovators and imitators is perfectly in line with "the upper
class theory of fashion" (Veblen, 1924). In particular Matsuyama (1992) has developed
an evolutionary model of fashions. In his model individuals belong to one of two groups,
respectively, with conformist and with anti-conformist preferences, and the equilibrium
shows a chase-ﬂight pattern, with anti-conformist playing the role of fashion leaders and
conformist playing the role of fashion followers.
7Similar results are showed by Corneo and Jeanne (1999). They describe a continuous-
time economy populated by two types of individuals, “desirable type” (natives) and “un-
desirable type” (tourists), in which an action has been interpreted as a choice of location.
Their model describes the dynamics of social location, deﬁning the conditions for the take-
oﬀ. In particular, they show that "if an arbitrarily small number of individuals from a
socially desirable group innovate, a large wave of imitators will follow even when the new
behaviour is more costly than the old one.
8ISTAT (Istituto Nazionale di Statistica) is the Oﬃcial National Statistical Institute
and its database is based on Ministry of the Interior.
4tas report9 for the period between 2001 and 2003. Both the ISTAT dataset
and the Caritas data were supplied by the Ministry of Internal Aﬀairs, and
were up-dated and revised by the oﬃcial statistical institute until 200010
(therefore, the two datasets overlap in the period between 1994 and 2000).
We can see that the migration process does not proceed smoothly, but it
has sudden increases in the inﬂow growth rates. In some periods the inﬂow
growth rate doubles (like in Germany and Netherlands), sometimes triples
(like in Netherlands and UK) and sometimes increases even more (Italy and
Sweden or for some ethnic groups in the other countries).
Looking at the immigration reforms11 (see Boeri and Bucker, 2005) in
the countries and in the periods considered, we can see that they are not
homogeneous with respect to the generosity of the welfare system for the
immigrants. In two cases (UK and Netherlands) the reforms tightened the
condition for immigration, in one case (Sweden) the policy did not substan-
tially change over the years and in the last two cases (Germany and Italy),
favoured immigration. Furthermore in Germany, the reform did not directly
aﬀect immigration. Because of the heterogeneity of reforms as a homoge-
neous phenomenon it seems that, at ﬁrst glance, the immigration reforms
were not the only variable aﬀecting migration choice. For this we looked for
an additional endogenous explanation that could explain migration jumps.
9Caritas Internationalis however “is a confederation of 162 Catholic relief, development
and social service organisations working in over 200 countries and territories” (Caritas,
2003). The edition of the Caritas Statistic Immigration Report is part of the project “The
image of Migrants in Italy, Through Media, Civil Society and the Labour Market”, devel-
oped in the framework of the EU/EQUAL Initiative, managed by the Italian Ministry of
Welfare. The project has been promoted by the International Organization for Migration,
Caritas of Rome and the Archive of Immigration and involves other 19 partners, including
both Italian and immigrant associations. The ﬁrst Caritas Report (“Dossier Statistico Im-
migrazione”) was produced by the Caritas Organization since 1991 and it has now become
an annual report on immigration.
10For the lack of oﬃcial revised data after year 2000 at the moment of our submission,
we have used Caritas dataset for the years between 2001 and 2003.
11Source: Fondazione Rodolfo Benedetti Documentation Centre, http://www.frdb.org.




Growth rate  
Period 3 
Germany               
  China  1,28  1995-1999  3,21  2000-2002  2,87  2003 
  Nigeria  1,17  1995-1999  2,09  2000-2003     
  Syria  1,09  1995-1998  1,52  1999-2003     
  Thailand  0,76  1995-1999  1,11  2000-2003     
Italy               
  Albania  0,11  1994-1996  0,89  1997  0,12  1998-2003 
  China  0,10  1994-1996  0,63  1997  0,07  1998-2003 
  Philippines  0,06  1994-1996  0,24  1997  -0,03  1998-2003 
  Romania  0,19  1994-1996  0,32  1997-2000  0,16  2001-2003 
Netherlands               
  Angola  1,83  1996-1999  4,48  2000-2002     
  China  1,33  1996-2000  3,24  2001-2002     
  Sudan  1,67  1996-1997  2,43  1998-2001  1,86  2002 
  Suriname  1,41  1996-2000  2,70  2001-2002     
Sweden               
  Chile  0,88  1981-1985  2,71  1986-1989  0,46  1990-2001 
  Ethiopia  0,81  1981-1985  4.01  1986-1992  0,93  1993-2001 
  Iceland  1,83  1981-1988  5,20  1989-1990  1,47  1991-2001 
  Somalia  0,25  1981-1990  3,84  1991-1994  1,43  1995-2001 
UK               
  Ghana  1,04  1992-1998  1,72  1999-2004     
  Pakistan  1,12  1992-1998  2,04  1999-2003  1,76  2004 
  Somalia  2,98  1992-1999  19,98  2000-2002  9,71  2003-2004 
  Turkey  1,25  1992-1995  3,57  1996-2004     
 
Table 1: Average Migration Growth Rates.
Finally, since we focused our analysis on Italy, in ﬁgure 1 we have shown
the four main foreign ﬂows and their growth rates in Italy between 1994
and 2003: Albanians, Chinese, Filipinos and Romanians12.T h em i g r a t i o n
ﬂows have been depleted from the two important regularizations for illegal
immigrants introduced in Italy in 1996 and 1998, and registrated by the
12Description of data:
• According to ISTAT (Istituto Nazionale di Statistica), "foreigners" in Italy are
persons with foreign citizenship. A child born to parents who are both foreign
citizens is considered to be a foreigner as well. A child born to an Italian and
a foreign parent is considered to be an Italian citizen. Once a foreigner acquires
Italian citizenship, they are not reported in oﬃcial statistics as foreigners any more.
• Data are based on the number of valid residence permits issued to foreigners as of
December 31 of each year. Children under 18 years old who are registered on their
parents’ permits are not counted.
6ISTAT database in subsequently years13. For the sake of completeness, Figure
2 also shows the wage diﬀerentials in the same period. These were obtained
from the World Bank International Comparison Programme database and




























Figure 1: Migration Jumps
13The expectation of regularization programs foreseen by potential immigrants, can be
interpreted as an endogenous cause for migration. Nevertheless the political programs
are not common knowledge. In fact in the period after 1991 in Italy a quota system

























Figure 2: Wage levels
Figure 1 shows that, for all nationalities, the migration process was not
smooth. We observed "some substantial high increases in the inﬂow growth
rates" that we deﬁned as "migration jumps". In particular, we can see an
important jump in 1997 after a certain number of years characterised by
low waves, as if a mass of individuals was waiting for something to happen
before deciding to migrate. Moreover, all nationalities showed heterogeneities
in their behaviour after 1997: the Chineses and the Filipinos had declining
ﬂows, whereas the Romanians had a second jump in 200015.
Another important aspect was that the wage diﬀerential did not seem to
be the main variable driving migration ﬂows. In all cases (except, partially,
for Romania and Albania), the jumps did not occur together with a steady
rise in relative wage levels, as stressed by Moretti (1998). Then, if policy
choices do not completely explain migration dynamics, why do potential mi-
grants wait before taking their decision to migrate? What are they waiting
for? And why do they move on mass? We tried to answer all these ques-
tions by examining whether the migration investment characteristics and the
role of ethnic groups, can explain the migration jumps observed in Figure
1. Although the phenomenon may be consistent with various explanations,
simple arguments have to do with logistics: it takes time to decide and co-
ordinate migration. This is consistent with the progressive acceleration in
15The same phenomenon is also showed for ﬁve European countries in the updated
(2007) version of Vergalli (2006) at the link http://digilander.libero.it/sergio.vergalli/.
8migration ﬂows: migration delays arise because it is worth waiting to decide
when certain fundamental uncertainties are resolved over time and the deci-
sion is mostly irreversbile. A logistic curve also shows the fact that learning
about the host country’s labour market takes place sequentially and strongly
depends on the role of an ethnic network in the host country.
This paper is organised as follows. Section 3 presents the model and
the basic assumptions. Section 4 develops the theoretical framework that
combines real option theory and the network eﬀects, namely the optimal mi-
gration strategy in the presence of positive and negative externalities. Section
5 calibrates the model and Section 6 makes some simulations which conﬁrm
the theoretical results. Finally, section 7 summarises the conclusions.
2 The Model
We assumed that an individual that immigrates to another country is com-
pletely integrated when his economic and social status is no diﬀerent from
the native one. Nevertheless, the timing of the migrant’s integration suﬀers
from a phenomenon of attrition because of the lack of information about the
host country and its labour market. We also assume that in the host coun-
try, a homogeneous group of people (a community/ a network) exists that
can help each immigrant to increase integration. The larger the community,
the closer the ties among its members and then the higher the integration
probability. The number of ties also depends on idiosyncratic characteristics
of the immigrants, that we call "behavioural rationale" using the Bass termi-
nology. That is, the more "sociable" an individual or a group of individuals,
the stronger and more ties they have.
2.1 The basic assumptions
Our main assumptions are the following:
0. There exist two countries: the country of origin where each potential
migrant takes decisions and the host country.
1. At any time t a risk-neutral16 individual is free to decide to migrate to the
host conutry discounting future beneﬁts (the wage diﬀerential between
16See Burda (1995), Khwaja (2002) and Locher (2002) for the use of this assumption.
9t h eh o s tc o u n t r ya n dt h ec o u n t r yo fo r i g i n )a tt h ec o n s t a n ti n t e r e s tr a t e
ρ.
2. When the migrant arrives in the host country, he/she receives only a
percentage ξ<1 of the host wage as ﬁrst entry wage17.S od e ﬁning wo
i
as the wage of her country of origin (where i is the country), we are









3. In the host country there is a community of ethnically homogeneous in-
dividuals that helps each member to integrate with the host labour
market (or to obtain a legal job if she is working on the illegal market).
When the immigrant is completely integrated, he/she gets the diﬀer-
ence between the legal host current market wage w and the wage of the




i ≡ [1 − w
o
i/w]w = φiw
4. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the country-speciﬁc percentages
φ
0
i and φi (φ
0
i ≤ φi) are constant over time18.
5. Each individual enters a new country undertaking a single irreversible
investment which requires an initial sunk cost K.
6. T h es i z eo ft h ei m m i g r a n tdn is inﬁnitesimally small compared to the total
number of previous immigrants n.
7 Finally, the inverse labour demand for immigrants in the host country at




17Empirical evidence shows that this is true whether the migrant ﬁnds a legal or an
illegal job (see Chiswick,1978; Borjas, 1990; Massey, 1987).
18We calibrate them as the loss in Purchasing Power Parity with respect to the initial
year of our dataset. See section 5 below.
10where θ is a labour-demand-speciﬁcs h o c k ,ζ<0 is the elasticity and
w is the average wage of the host country19.
We introduce uncertainty into the model by assuming that:
8. The labour-demand-speciﬁcs h o c kθ follows a Brownian motion:
dθ(t)=αθ(t)dt + σθ(t)dW(t) (2)
with θ(t0)=θ and α, σ > 0 are constant over time. The component
dW(t) is a Wiener disturbance deﬁned as dW(t)=ε(t)
√
dt,w h e r e
ε(t) ∼ N(0,1) is a white noise stochastic process (Cox and Miller,
1965).
9. The time taken to become perfectly integrated, say τ, is stochastic and
depends on a distribution of probability deﬁned as:
1 − Fτ (t) ≡ Pr(τ>tp t>0) (3)
and its corresponding hazard rate is 20:
pτ (t) ≡
fτ (t)
1 − Fτ (t)
(4)
where fτ (t) is the density function or the likelihood of being perfectly
integrated at t.
Each immigrant decides when to enter a new country maximising his/her
net beneﬁtv a l u ed e ﬁned as the expected discounted stream of wage diﬀeren-
tials over the planning horizon (taken inﬁnite for simplicity) minus the entry
cost K.
By (1) and assumptions 3-8 the beneﬁts from being completely integrated
at τ are given by21:
19There are two implicit assumptions beyond (1). Firstly, that all incumbent immigrants
have a job and that all future immigrants seek a job. Secondly, that w refers to labour
markets that are occupied mainly by immigrants so that we can ignore the role of native
employees (Heitmueller, 2003).
20pτ (t) is the migrant’s conditioned probability of obtaining a better job at time t+dt,
if he/she has worked at a low wage till t.
21If all immigrants face the same instantaneous probability of death λdt,w ec a nd e ﬁne
ρ = b ρ + λ, where b ρ is the market rate (Dixit and Pindyck, 1993, p. 200).
























where B(•) accounts for the future evolution of the number of migrants n(t),
t ≥ τ. The expectation operator Eτ(•) is taken with respect to the random
variables τ and θ(t) (and then n(t)) .N e x t ,t a k i n gi n t oa c c o u n tt h eb e n e ﬁts
the immigrant may gain before integrating, we end up with a total beneﬁt















where n(0) = n; θ(0) = θ. By using an indicator function J[τ>t] that assumes
the value one or zero depending on whether the argument is true or false, we








































where the expectation is now taken only with respect to θ(t) (and n(t)).
12If the beneﬁt value function V (•) is known, the optimal migration policy
implies that the return from migration must be at least equal to cost K at
the entry point. In other words, we need to ﬁnd the curve θ
∗ (n(t)) (i.e., the
value of the labour demand shock) at which the n(t)th migrant is indiﬀerent
between immediate entry or waiting22:
V [n(t),θ
∗ ((n(t))] − K =0 (9)
This is what we shall do in the next section.
2.2 The entry time τ and the network eﬀect
Before turning to the migrant’s optimal policy, we need to model the proba-
bility of integrating (3). We have deﬁned two diﬀerent groups of migrants:
• innovators: those individuals that decide to migrate independent of
the decisions of other individuals in a social system. They are the
pioneers or the individualists: their decision depends on their intrinsic
characteristics.
• imitators: those individuals inﬂuenced in the timing of migration by the
number of previous migrants. In particular, we refer to the individuals
who follow the innovators. Their particular behavioural characteristic
is their sociality: they have strong ties among themselves and tend to
establish a network23.
Following Bass(1969), the probability that perfect integration occurs at
t, given that no integration has yet occurred, is set as a linear function of the
size of the community, i.e.,
pτ (t)=a + bFτ (t) (10)
where Fτ (t) stands for the number of immigrants already entered; a is the
coeﬃcient of innovation, the inﬂuence on entry regardless of the number of
22This condition is familiar in the real option theory with the name of matching value
condition (see Dixit and Pindyck, 1994).
23A recent economic approach calls a similar phenomenon herd behaviour, i.e.: "I will
go to where I have observed others go" (Bauer et al., 2002).
13previous members; b is the coeﬃcient of imitation, the impact of previous
members on the probability of entry at time t. By using algebraic operations













where m is the (ﬁxed) total number of immigrants over the planning horizon,
which represents the critical "saturation" dimension of the community24.
Finally, we get limn→m fτ (t)=0and fτ (t) is concave iff b > 0.


























2.3 The beneﬁtf u n c t i o n
Network migration theory suggests that beneﬁt is a positive function in both
wages and network size (Massey et al. 1993). However, by (13), suppressing
time for the sake of simplicity, we can write the beneﬁt function per unit of
time as:
π(n,θ) ≡ u(n)θ (14)
24By observing that the cumulative function is a logistic curve, m corresponds to the
carrying capacity deﬁned as "the number of individuals an environment can support with-
out signiﬁcant negative impacts to the given organism and its environment" (Vandermeer
and Goldberg, (2004)). It corresponds to the congestion level of the community. Since
fτ (t) is the likelihood of being perfectly integrated at τ,the total number of immigrants













and Bass(n) ≡ [a + b−a
m n − b
m2n2].
Apart from shock θ, each immigrant shares the same "utility" u(n). The
overall shape of u(n) is ambiguous: it depends heavily on the struggle be-
tween the competitive eﬀect (i.e., more immigrants reduce wages depending
on the magnitude of the elasticity ζ) and the network eﬀect (i.e., individuals
gain "utility" by increasing the number of fellow countrymen which in turn
increases the probability of integration via the Bass function Bass(n)). Ac-
cording to the relative magnitude of these two eﬀects, we can observe three
shapes of u(n) as in Figure 3.
     u(n)      I       II
u(n)=u(n’)         u(n)
       u(n”)        u(n”)
    n’ n”      n n              n”          n
    III
     u(n)
       n n
Figure 3: Peculiar shape of u(n)
15Let us analyse Figure 3 from quadrant I to quandrant III for decreas-
ing levels of elasticity, ceteris paribus:
quadrant I
This is the general case for a not very low level of elasticity ζ.Ar e l a t i v e
minimum in n” and a relative maximum in n e x i s tt h a td i v i d et h ef u n c t i o n
into three intervals:
1. In the interval n ∈ (0,n”), the competition eﬀect prevails over the
network eﬀect: a new entry reduces the beneﬁt more than the gain
caused by cooperation among members of the community.
2. In the interval n ∈ (n”,n) the network eﬀect prevails: the beneﬁt
increases with n until the dimension of the network reaches level n.
3. In the interval n ∈ (n,m) the competition eﬀect prevails: the beneﬁt
decreases with n until the dimension of the community hits the satura-
tion level m. Competition is coupled with a phenomenon of congestion
as n moves toward m.
A ss h o w ni nF i g u r e3 ,w i t h i nt h ei n t e r v a l(0,n”) a level n0 exists such
that u(n0)=u(n). Further, for n>n 0 each immigrant earns beneﬁtl o w e r
than u(n0) until the community size reaches the relative maximum n.T h e n
each immigrant receives a lower beneﬁti fh e / s h ee n t e r sw i t hac o m m u n i t y
population n ∈ (n0,n).
Since the critical level of n0 depends on the relative inﬂuence of the com-
petition and network eﬀects, for diﬀerent levels of elasticity we can observe
the following:
quadrant II
Even if for low value of n competition prevails over the network eﬀect,
the latter dominates any other eﬀect as n increases. This implies that for
each individual, it is expedient to wait for the maximum beneﬁt u(n) before
entering.
quadrant III
Since ζ → 0 implies that n0 → 0, for very low levels of elasticity, the
beneﬁt function simply assumes an inverse U-shape.
163M i g r a t i o n d y n a m i c s
Applying Itô’s Lemma to (14) and substituting (2) to eliminate dθ,w eg e ta n
expression for the rate of change of π in terms of the shock and the network
size:
dπ = μ(n)πdn+ απdt + σπdw, with π0 ≡ u(n0)θ0 = π (15)
In (15) the ﬁrst term μ(n) ≡ u0 (n)/u(n) shows the direct eﬀect of migra-
tion ﬂows. Migration inﬂuences the level of beneﬁts through its eﬀect on the
labour market equilibrium depending on the dimension of the community. In
particular, given any value of the shock θ, more immigrants imply a higher
or lower equilibrium level of beneﬁts depending on the presence of positive
μ(n) > 0 or negative μ(n) < 0 network externalities, respectively.
3.1 Optimal migration policy for n>n (and <n 0).
If the initial size of the community is n ≥ n (or n 6 n0), we can expect
migration to work in the following way. For any ﬁxed n,t h eb e n e ﬁts per unit
of time move according to the above stochastic process with μ(n)dn =0 .
If they climb to a certain level π∗ = u(n)θ
∗(n), migration becomes feasible,
the network size increases from n to n + dn and the beneﬁts go downward
along the function u(n).B e n e ﬁts will then continue to move stochastically
without the term μ(n)dn, until another entry episode occurs25.T h i sc a nb e
summarized by the following proposition:
Proposition 1 If n ≥ n (or n 6 n0), the optimal migration policy is de-












where ρ>αand β1 > 1 is the positive root of the auxiliary quadratic equation
Ψ(β)=1
2σ2β(β − 1) + αβ − ρ =0 .
25In technical terms, the threshold π∗ becomes an upper reﬂecting barrier on the beneﬁt
process (see Harrison, 1985).
17Proof. See Leahy (1993) and the Appendix
I nt h ea r e aa b o v et h ec u r v e ,i ti so p t i m a lt om i g r a t e :aw a v eo fm i g r a n t s
will enter in a lump to move the beneﬁt level immediately to the threshold
c u r v e . I nt h er e g i o nb e l o wt h ec u r v et h eo p t i m a lp o l i c yi si n a c t i o n . T h e
individual waits until the stochastic process θ moves it vertically to θ
∗(n) and
then again a ﬂow of migrants will jump into the host country just enough
not to cross the threshold.
The "utility" threshold that triggers migration by individual immigrants
is identical to that of the individual that correctly anticipates the other immi-
grants’ strategies. This property, discovered by Leahy (1993), has an impor-
tant operative implication: the optimal migration policy of each individual
n e e dn o tt a k ea c c o u n to ft h ee ﬀect of rivals’ entry. She/He can behave com-
petitively as if he/she is the last to enter26.
3.2 Optimal migration policy for n0 <n<n
For n ∈ (n0,n), the network beneﬁt prevails over the competitive eﬀect and
then we expect the timing of an individual’s entry is inﬂuenced by the entry
decisions of others.
Intuition suggests that Leahy’s result cannot be extended to cover this
case. Since there are positive externalities, the higher the number of members
in the community the greater the advantage in terms of beneﬁt ﬂow. This is
evident in the case of an U-shaped beneﬁt function (quadrant III in Figure
3) but it also works for the general case as u(n0)=u(n) and the "utility"
is lower in within (quadrant I in Figure 3). Therefore, although entering
may be proﬁtable, it is more expensive to do so ﬁrst than to enter later on,
when others have already done so. This makes the trigger π∗ = u(n)θ
∗(n)
26In other words, when an individual decides to enter, by pretending to be the last to
migrate, he/she is ignoring two things: 1) He/she is thinking that his/her beneﬁt ﬂow
is given by u(n)θ, with n held ﬁxed forever. Thus, as u0(n) < 0, he/she is ignoring that
future entry by other members, in response to a higher value of θ, will reduce "utility". All
things being equal, this would make entry more attractive for the migrant that behaves
myopically. 2) He/she is unaware that the prospect of future entry by competitors reduces
the option value of waiting. That is, pretending to be the last to migrate, the individual
also believes he/she still has a valuable option of waiting before making an irreversible
decision. All things being equal, this makes the decision to enter less attractive. The
two eﬀects oﬀset each other, allowing the migrant to act as if in isolation (see Dixit and
Pindyck, 1994, p. 291).
18no longer optimal: each migrant can do better by delaying entry27.
However, as all individuals are subject to the same labour demand stochas-
tic shock, two equilibrium patterns are possible: either the community re-
mains locked-in at the initial size n0 <n<n, sustained by self-fulﬁlling
pessimistic expectations (inﬁnite delay), or a mass of individuals simultane-
ously rushes to enter. Excluding the former28, we can expect entry to work
in the following way: for a ﬁxed size of the network, π moves according to
the process (15) with μ(n)dn =0 .I fb e n e ﬁts climb to π∗∗ = u(n)θ
∗∗(n), it
will trigger an entry of discrete size n − n that raises the dimension of the
community instantaneously by a jump. The exact form of the trigger θ
∗∗ is
given in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 If 0 ≤ n0 <n<n, the optimal migration policy for a mass












Proof. See Moretto (2003) and the Appendix
Thus starting at n, if the initial shock is below the known trigger θ
∗(n),
all the migrants wait until θ r i s e st ot h i sl e v e l ,a n dt h e ncoordinate their
entry to bring the size to the optimal level n.W o r k i n gb a c kt o w a r d sn’, it
is veriﬁed for every n,a sl o n ga sθ
∗(n0) is equal to θ
∗(n). In fact, if it were
θ
∗(n0) >θ
∗(n), it could be convenient to delay entry until θ
∗(n),b e c a u s eo fa
higher obtainable beneﬁt. Once the optimal size is reached and to the right
of n, further decision to enter proceeds as explained in the previous section
without externalities. Intuitively, starting at any n0 <n<n,P r o p o s i t i o n
2 locates the optimal entry threshold so as to maximise the total beneﬁts
of the incremental number of members that enter (n − n). The shock value
θ
∗(n) that triggers this individual’s competitive run29 is the same threshold
that justiﬁes further marginal entry under decreasing beneﬁts.
27The decision problem involved here resembles one of war of attrition where each agent
waits for rivals to concede (Moretto, 2000).
28We exclude the former by using the subgame-perfectness arguments (see Moretto
(2003)).
29The term competitive run refers to Bartolini’s deﬁnition (1993).
194C a l i b r a t i o n
To simulate the optimal migration policy we need values for the variables
and parameters in equation (14). We could then calculate (16) and (17) and
then solve for n∗. To perform this calibration we used the migration ﬂows for
Albanians, Filipinos, Chinese and Romanians and the wage levels (deﬂated
using the Bank of Italy deﬂator) obtained from the ISTAT database30.A s
we show below, determining values for most of the model’s inputs is rea-
sonably straightforward. Estimating the coeﬃcients of the labour demand’s
stochastic process θ and of the Bass probability of integration a and b is more
complex as will be discussed below.
4.1 Basic inputs
The parameters to be calibrated are listed in Table 2: for the discount rate
we have used a basic level ρ2 =0 .03 (Nordhaus,1996) and a higher level
ρ1 =0 .0531. We also add a mortality rate λ =0 .001 calculated by the
Istituto Superiore della Sanità32 on ISTAT data.
According to assumption 2 and 3, the diﬀerential wage is assumed to be
a constant percentage of the wage of the host country and varies whether
the immigrant is completely integrated in the host country or not: φi and
φ
0
i respectively. The percentage for complete integration φi has been cali-
brated considering the GDP per capita based on Purchasing Power Parity of
the initial year 1993, as listed in the International Comparison Programme
database of the World Bank. If the immigrant is not integrated, he/she earns
only a fraction ξ o ft h ew a g e .W eh a v ec a l i b r a t e dξ and then the correspond-
ing percentage φ
0
i referring to the works of Massey (1987), Borjas (1990) and
Chiswick (1978)33. The resulting φ
0
i and φi are shown in Table 3.
30For the robustness of our analysis we have calibrated our parameters by using only
the oﬃcial data for the years 1994-2000.
31Policy uncertainty regulating immigrants’ ﬂows can also explain the choice of two
diﬀerent discount rates. In particular, policy uncertainty acts as a scale factor on the
optimal threshold and it can be modelised as a poisson process. See Vergalli (2005) and
Rodick (1991).
32www.iss.it
33In particular Massey estimates that the illegal wage is 63% of the legal wage. Borjas
and Chiswick show that the entry wage for each immigrant is 79% or 85 % of the native
one respectively.
204.2 Demand volatility
The calibration of Italian immigrants’ labour demand elasticity has two prob-
lems: the lack of studies on Italy’s demand function for immigrants34 and
the lack of work that isolates the eﬀect of immigration inﬂow for foreigners
and not only all (or native) workers. This problem can be overcome if we
look at the EU and US work on the level of labour demand elasticity and
standard deviation of the stochastic shock θ. For European labour market
(especially for Germany and France) some work shows elasticity levels be-
tween -0,021 (Bauer, 1997) and -0,24 (De New and Zimmermann, 1994), even
if, also in these cases, some identiﬁcation problems about immigrants elas-
ticity, remain35. For the US there are many papers that try to estimate the
peculiar eﬀect of entering immigrants on labour wages. All the U.S. elasticity
levels seem to converge towards two representative values36: −0.2 (Borjas,
1990) −0.02 (Borjas, 1994). On this basis we use the following elasticities
ζ1 = −0.2 and ζ2 = −0.02, that seem to be representative both for the US
and for the EU labour market. To calculate an estimate of the variance of
θ, we used the boot-strap method37, obtaining two levels of variance σ1 and
34In this respect: Gavosto et al. (1999) show a positive elasticity for natives (+0,01)
that the author justiﬁes as a short-term eﬀect; Venturini (1999) ﬁnds a long term elasticity
in the non-regular labour market between -0,01 and -0,02; Venturini (1997) calculates an
elasticity level of -0,3 and -0,5 among all the workers.
35Furthermore, Peri (2005) shows an elasticity level of -0,4 among all European workers;
De New and Zimmermann (1994) ﬁnd an elasticity level for blue collar foreigners in
Germany equal to -0,24; again in Germany, Bauer (1997) has a value of -0,021; Hunt
(1992) about elasticity with respect foreigners share in occupation in France, shows a level
between -0,139 and -0,08; Gang and Rivera-Batiz (1994) have a level between -0,01 and
-0,11, while Garson et al. (1987) show a level included between -0,01 and -0,04 for the
French labour market.
36Borjas (1994) reviewing the literature argues that the value of the elasticity should be
between -0.01 and -0.06. Dos Santos (2000) aﬃrms that ”from an empirical point of view,
many studies attempt to estimate the impact of immigration on wages. The elasticity of
wages with respect to the number of immigrants is generally found to be between -0.01
and -0.02”. Garson (1987), using 1985 data, coming from ISEE, ﬁnds a level of elasticity
between -0.01 and -0.04. Borjas (1990), using data from the US census of 1990, shows
a level around -0.2 and in a recent paper (2003) he obtains an elasticity around -0.33.
Antonji and Card (1991), using data of the US census 1970-1980, ﬁnds a level of -0.3.
37The bootstrap method is a computer-based method for assigning measures of accuracy
to sample estimates (Efron and Tibshirani 1994). This technique allows estimation of
the sample distribution of almost any statistic using simple methods (Varian 2005), like
resampling with replacement from the original sample, most often with the purpose of
21σ2 for each ﬂow, corresponding respectively to ζ1 = −0.2 and ζ1 = −0.02.
These values are reported in Table 4.
4.3 Bass parameters
Finally for the parameters of the Bass model (i.e. a, b, m), we applied a
recursive method proposed by Bass (1969, p. 224) using the years 1996, 1997
and 1998 as initial conditions38. The results are described in Table 4. Simple
observation shows that in all cases, the coeﬃcient b is greater than a, which
guarantees the concavity of the Bass function Bass(n).
5 Results
To compare diﬀerent migration inﬂows, we simulated the optimal trigger
levels (16) and (17), for the four migration waves, in the case of elasticity
levels −0.02 and −0.2. Because of the diﬃculty of perfectly quantifying the
migration costs, we normalised K to the same arbitrary level for all cases39.
The principal results are shown in Figures 4 and 5 and are displayed in Table
5.
deriving estimates of standard errors and conﬁdence intervals of a population parameter
like a mean, median, proportion, odds ratio, correlation coeﬃcient or regression coeﬃcient.
In our case, by using known parameters (elasticity level, wage level, number of immigrants),
generating errors 1000 times, we have obtained two unknown levels of variance for each
elaticity value.
38By Considering (12) as the basic equation, we know that: n(t)=mf (t)=am +( b −
a)n(t) − b
mn2 (t). In estimating the parameters from discrete time series data we use the
following analogue: n(t)=j+vn(t − 1)+zn2 (t − 1), for t= 2,3...., where n(t)i m m i g r a n t s
at t,a n dn(t−1) =
X
n(t) cumulative immigrants through period t-1. Since j estimates
am, v estimates (b − a),a n dz estimates −(b/m): −mz = b, j/m = a. Then (b-a)=-mz-
j/m=b, and zm2 +vm+j =0 ,or m =( −v ±
p
v2 − 4zj)/2z, and the parameters a,b and
ma r ei d e n t i ﬁed. See Bass (page 219) for further details.




















































Figure 5: Optimal triggers level for ζ1 = −0,2
Some remarks are in order:
1. In all ethnic groups, the wave starts when the network size, (n∗
m), reaches
2330% or 40% of the critical saturation level m40,f o rζ1 = −0.2 and
ζ2 = −0.02 respectively. Yet, the lower the elasticity level the bigger
the wave, that is, as market competition increases the network eﬀect
and the ties among immigrants reduce and they seem to be unable to
coordinate entry perfectly.
2. The higher the elasticity, the higher the threshold level θ
∗ and the
lower the migration ﬂo w .T h i sf a c td e p e n d so nt h es u mo ft w oe ﬀects:
(i) the labour market competition, increasing with the absolute level
of ζ; (ii) the network eﬀect that depends on the probability of being
completely integrated (i.e., Bass function). The combined eﬀect deﬁnes
the magnitude of the beneﬁt perceived by every migrant in the host
country. On the one hand, a high number of incumbent immigrants
increases the total beneﬁt due to the network eﬀect. On the other
hand, however, low wave dimensions require a high shock to trigger
entry.
3. A higher ρ magniﬁes the optimal trigger as expected.
4. The highest ﬂows observed in the data are consistent with the predic-
tions of the model (i.e., n∗ with respect to n_1997 i nT a b l e5 ) :t h er e a l
wave is between the upper and the lower simulated ﬂow in every case
studied.
5. The higher φ
0
i or φi,t h el o w e rt h ee n t r yt r i g g e rθ
∗ as expected.
In particular it emerged that the Albanian ﬂow is the ﬁrst to start in
the case of low demand elasticity and the second for high elasticity. This
happens just behind the Chinese ﬂow (the second and the ﬁrst, respectively),
with wide jump dimensions. Nevertheless, since the historical timing of the
entries shows that the Chinese ﬂow is more recent than the Albanian one,
the level of elasticity on the labour market might be close to ζ2
41.
The timing of the migration phenomenon also depends on the particular
ethnic characteristics summarised in the Bass parameters: the higher the
imitator’s parameter b, the earlier the migration starts. This is due to a high
network eﬀect that oﬀsets labour market competition with a larger wave.
40The parameter m is described in note 23 and its values are in table 4.
41We should remember that, since the labour demand shock is depicted as a Brownian
motion (2), the higher the threshold level, the longer the time elapsed.
24Moreover, the higher the innovator’s parameter a, t h el o w e rt h et i e sa m o n g
immigrants and the higher the number of ﬁrst entries. This can explain
the diﬀerences in behaviour among the four migration inﬂo w so b s e r v a b l ei n
Figures 4 and 5. In fact, the Filipinos, characterised by strong individualist
behaviour, showed a magniﬁed ﬁrst entry but a reduced jump size; vice versa,
the Chinese, the Albanians and the Romanians were characterised by higher
imitator parameters and a higher wave.
5.1 Entry costs
So far, we have compared diﬀerent entry triggers based on normalised sunk
costs K. This normalization allows the Bass model to describe the migration
behaviour of the ﬂows, by deﬁning the percentage of innovators and imitators
in each ﬂo w ,t h u ss h o w i n gt h ei m p l i c i ts i g n a l st h a td r i v et h ew a v e s .
We can now step back and following the theory, “quantify” the entry
costs faced by the four diﬀerent ethnic groups by inverting (16) and (17)
and evaluating them at their minimum level42. The results are shown in
Table 6 from which we can conclude two main points: (1) The geographical
distance is not the focal element of sunk costs, as generally stressed in the
economic literature. In fact, the Philippines and Romania face a K similar to
Albania and China. This implies that the sunk cost faced by the immigrant
must be a wider basket of socio-economic elements; (2) it is important to
stress that the sunk costs displayed correspond to the optimal threshold.
In all cases, since the migration occurred in the same year (i.e., 1997), the
migrants entered a labour market with the same shock magnitude. This fact
meant that all immigrants gained a similar labour market beneﬁtb u tf a c e d
diﬀerent costs: for the same level of wages some ethnic groups were able to
face higher costs. Which element made the diﬀerence? The answer is in the
"behavioural rationale": high cooperative behaviour helped each individual
to face a higher cost. Therefore, the timing of the entry should be inversely
related to the sunk cost in the optimum, i.e., Albania ﬁrst, China, Romania
42In fact, if the jump started when the trigger reached the minimum level, we can take
the value of the observed ﬂows (see the 7th column in the Table 4) and the level of the
wage in the year of the peak and substitute these values in the following equation:
K∗ = w∗ β1 − 1











25and then the Philippines. Comparing this rank with Figures 3 and 4, it
appears that the true labour demand elasticity should be nearer −0.02.
5.2 Saturation level
Although the simulations appear to be consistent with the ISTAT data be-
tween 1994 and 2000, we wanted to check whether the model was also con-
sistent over time, by displaying the results of the 2004 CARITAS migration
report in Table 7. According to our model, the Romanian community should
be near saturation level, but this fact does not correspond to current data
by CARITAS that shows an increase in Romanian immigration waves.
We suggest two explanations for this. First, our analysis uses the whole
national migration ﬂow as a single community, and this surely overestimates
the alienation eﬀect. We should consider single regional homogeneous ethnic
groups. Secondly, due to the particular method used to calibrate the Bass
parameters, the critical saturation level m is strongly time-dependent. To
overcome this problem we have calibrated the Bass coeﬃcients one and two
steps ahead displaying the changes in "behavioural rationale" of the proce-
dure.
5.2.1 “Forward Projection Technique”
In the Bass methodology, m depends on the years (initial condition) used
to calculate the parameters a and b. In particular we used 1996, 1997 and
1998. We then repeated the analysis by using 1996, 1997 and 1999 and then
1996, 1997 and 2000. Values for a, b and m are reported in Table 8 and 9
respectively.
In Figure 6 we show three curves for the Albanian triggers. theta98 is
the benchmark case calibrated with the years 1996, 1997 and 1998, theta99
with 1996, 1997 and 1999 and ﬁnally theta00 with 1996, 1997 and 2000. The











































































Moving ahead, the last year in calibrating the Bass parameters caused a
substantial change in the shape of the entry trigger functions. In particular,
in both the ﬁgures, m(t) increases from theta98 to theta00 which implies,
27ceteris paribus, an increase in the size of the jump. Yet, the network eﬀect
is magniﬁed, diluting the innovators’ weight (this is why θ
∗ increases for
n → 0).
The higher the imitators’ coeﬃcient, the greater the perceived satura-
tion dimension will be 43. Therefore, if an ethnic group has strong ties, its
community will probably increase more than other groups, ceteris paribus.
Another eﬀect of the increasing imitator’s coeﬃcient with time, is that, the
stronger the network eﬀect, the lower the shock required to migrate. This
result is clearly shown in ﬁgure 6, but it does not emerge from ﬁgure 7. The
explanation of this odd result depends on the peculiar Romanian ﬂows char-
acterized by two jumps. In particular, moving ahead to the last year, the
Bass parameters incorporate even the second jump.
Finally, comparing Tables 4, 8 and 9, we can highlight how the "be-
havioural rationale" changes for the four ﬂows: the Chinese, Albanians and
Romanians become more cooperative, whereas the Filipinos seem to remain
more individualists. This may explain why some communities tend to ex-
plode and others increase at a constant rate.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper has tried to explain why migration ﬂows are characterised by ob-
servable jumps. Real option theory suggests that migration may be delayed
beyond the Marshallian trigger since the option value of waiting may be suf-
ﬁciently positive in the face of uncertainty. Possibly, waiting may resolve
uncertainty and thus enable avoidance of the downside risk of an irreversible
investment. Burda (1995) was the ﬁrst to use real option theory to explain
slow migration rates from East to West Germany despite a large wage diﬀer-
ential. Subsequent work (Khwaja, 2002; Anam et al., 2004) has developed
this approach describing the role of uncertainty in the migration decision.
Recent papers (Moretti, 1998; Bauer et al., 2004) show, however, that the
role of the community is important in the migration decision. In this paper,
we have shown a real option model where the choice to migrate depends on
the diﬀerential wage and on the probability of being integrated into a host
country. The corresponding integration probability is modelled following the
43Comparing the Filipino ﬂow to the Albanian ﬂow we notice that the Albanian growth
rate in the saturation level is higher than the Filipino one (see Tables 7 and 8).
28Bass model (1969) where the "behavioural rationale" of the migration ﬂows
is shown by two kinds of immigrants: innovators or individualists and imi-
tators.T h ew e i g h to fe a c hd i ﬀerent type inﬂuences the timing of migration
and the size of the community. The closer the ties among the individuals,
the higher the dimension of the wave and the higher the entry cost faced,
ceteris paribus.
Furthermore, we observed two opposing forces that inﬂuenced entry: on
the labour market side, strong competition among workers in the host country
d e l a y se n t r y ;a tt h es a m et i m e ,t h em o r ei m m i g r a n t s ,t h eh i g h e rt h enetwork
eﬀect that reduces the optimal threshold and anticipates entry.
Simulations of some migration ﬂo w si n t oI t a l yo v e rt h el a s tt w e n t yy e a r s
ﬁt the theoretical approach and replicate the observable migration jumps at
least in the short-term. The model is able to project the induced labour
demand elasticity level of the host country and the "behavioural rationale"
of the migrants. Nevertheless, the use of national ﬂows, as a proxy for the
size of the communities, probably overestimates the results, suggesting future
disaggregation of the ethnic ﬂows.
29A Appendix
This appendix is dedicated to proving propositions 1 and 2 in the text. To
do this we rely on the work of Leahy (1993), Bartolini (1993), Dixit and
Pindyck (1994) and Moretto (2003).
To determine the migrant’s optimal entry policy, the ﬁrst thing to do
is to ﬁnd his/her value of being perfectly integrated given each individual’s
optimal future entry policy. A solution for (8) can be obtained starting
within a time interval where no entry occurs (n,θ < θ
∗).B y t h e t y p i c a l
methodology of real options, we obtain the general solution for (8) as (Dixit
and Pindyck, 1994, p.181):
V (n,θ)=A1 (n)θ
β1 + A2 (n)θ
β2 + v(n,θ) (18)
where 1 <β 1 <ρ / α ,β 2 < 0 are, respectively, the positive and the negative
root of the characteristic equation Ψ(β)=1
2σ2β(β − 1) + αβ − ρ =0 , and
A1,A 2 a r et w oc o n s t a n t st ob ed e t e r m i n e d .
To keep V (n,θ) ﬁnite as θ becomes small, i.e. lim
θ→0
V (n,θ)=0 , we discard
the term in the negative power of θ setting A2 =0 . Moreover, the boundary
conditions also require limθ→∞{V (n,θ) − v(n,θ)} =0 , where the second
term in the limit is the discounted present value of the beneﬁt ﬂows over an
























and Bass(n) ≡ [a + b−a
m n −
b






It is worth noting that for a ≤ b the function u(n), is shaped according to
Figure 3. Since the last term represents the value of being in the community
in the absence of new entry, then A1(n)θ
β1 must be the correction due to the
new entry, therefore A1(n) must be negative. To determine this coeﬃcient
for each n, we need to impose suitable boundary conditions. First of all,
free entry requires the (idle) migrant to expect zero beneﬁts on entry. Then,
indicating with θ
∗(n) the value of the shock θ at which the nth individual
30is indiﬀerent to immediate entry or waiting for another opportunity, the









Secondly, the number of migrants n aﬀects V (n,θ) depending on the sign of
θ
∗(n).S i n c eθ
β1 is always positive, any change in n either raises or lowers the
whole function V (n,θ), depending on whether the coeﬃcient A1(n) increases


















where, (since each individual rationally forecasts the future path of new en-
tries by competitors), Vn(n,θ
∗(n)) = 0 (Bartolini, 1993, proposition 1)44.
In conjunction with the (21), the above extended smooth pasting condition
states that either each migrant exercises his/her entry option at the level of
θ at which the value is tangent to the entry cost, i.e., Vθ(n,θ
∗(n)) = 0,o r
the optimal trigger θ
∗(n) does not change with n. While the former means
that the value function is smooth at entry and the trigger is a continuous
function of n, 45 the latter case states that, if this condition is not satisﬁed,
an individual would beneﬁt from marginally anticipating or delaying the
entry decision. In particular if Vθ(n,θ
∗(n)) < 0, it means that the value
of staying in the host country is expected to increase if θ falls (investing
now will be expected to lead to almost certain beneﬁts), on the contrary if
Vθ(n,θ
∗(n)) > 0 it means that a member would expect to make losses because
of a decrease in θ.I nb o t hs i t u a t i o n s( 2 3 )i ss a t i s ﬁed by imposing
dθ∗(n)
dn =0 ,
therefore the same level of shock may either trigger entry by a positive mass
of migrants or lock-in the community at the initial level of members.46
44Note that this is a generalisation of the condition in Dixit (1993, p. 35). If the migrant
pretends to be unique or the last entering the host country, then u0(n)=A0(n)=0and
the ﬁrst order condition reduces to Vθ(n,θ
∗(n)) = 0
45Moreover, as we assumed that the individual’s size is inﬁnitesimal, then the trigger
level θ
∗(n) is also a continuous function in n.
46If this condition does not hold, the expected beneﬁt gain or loss at θ
∗(n) would be
inﬁnite due to the inﬁnite variation property of the stochastic process θ.
31It should be noted that using (20), (21) and (23), it is possible to ﬁnd
the optimal threshold function. The solution depends on the concavity of
u(n). As we have seen in the previous part, a generic representation of u(n)
distinguishes three intervals for the particular shape of the beneﬁt function.
L e tu sn o ws o l v et h em o d e lb a c k w a r d s .
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
For the case of n ≤ n0 or n ≥ n we show two things: (i) the smooth pasting
condition (23) reduces to Vθ(n,θ
∗(n)) = 0; (ii) the optimal trigger θ
∗(n) is
equivalent to that of an individual in isolation, that is of a migrant pretending
to be the last to immigrate.
For (i), let us consider the value of a migrant being in the host country
starting at point (n,θ < θ
∗), and subject to the possibility of new entries
when θ hits θ
∗. Indicating with T the ﬁr s tt i m et h a tθ reaches the trigger θ
∗,
the optimal entry policy must then satisfy:

















































∗(n)) represents the optimal continuation value of staying in the
host country. Because, by (21), the present value of beneﬁts at T is K,t h e
above value can be written as:










or, after simpliﬁcation (Moretto, 2003):


















The value of being perfectly integrated (25) is the diﬀerence between the
value of a migrant with a myopic strategy pretending to be the last to have
32to migrate
u(n)θ
ρ−α and the value of an idle individual pretending to be the last







¢β1. To choose optimally θ
∗, the






























Since u(n) decreases in the interval [n,m],θ
∗(n) increases. Moreover, substi-





β1 (ρ − α)
< 0 (28)














from which it is easy to verify that Vn(n,θ) 6=0within the interval θ<θ
∗(n)
and zero at the boundary.
Now for (ii), let us suppose that all individuals have decided to enter
at ˆ θ, with θ
∗ < ˆ θ. This cannot be a (Nash) equilibrium because a single
migrant can do better by entering at θ
∗.I n f a c t , t h e ﬂow of beneﬁts that
each individual is able to obtain following the policy θ
∗ is the best that they
can do, at least till T. However, by the principle of optimality, this choice is
also optimal for the rest of the period as (24) shows: if the optimal policy of
the single migrant calls for them to be active at ˆ θ tomorrow, it immediately
follows that the optimal policy today is to enter at θ
∗.A s( 2 4 )i sac o n t i n u o u s
function in θ
∗, the limit as ˆ θ → θ
∗ shows that θ
∗ is a Nash equilibrium (Leahy,
1993, proposition 1).
If the elasticity is not too low we obtain an interval n ∈ (0,n 0) where
the competitive eﬀect prevails over the network eﬀect. Therefore, with these
results, within the interval (0,n 0) the optimal threshold is still given by (27)
until n0.F i n a l l y ,f o rζ → 0, n0 → 0.
33A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
For 0 ≤ n0 <n<n we have to show three things: (i) that an individual
cannot pretend to be the last to migrate and, therefore, the optimal compet-
itive trigger is no longer equivalent to that of a migrant in isolation; (ii) that
the candidate policy, described in the proposition 2, satisﬁes the necessary
and suﬃcient conditions of optimality; (iii) that it is a sub-game perfect
equilibrium47.
Let us assume that u(n) is U-shaped as in the quadrant III of ﬁgure 3.
For (i) and (ii), let us begin with an idle individual that follows the optimal
policy θ
∗(n).S i n c e θ
∗(n) is decreasing in the interval n<n:t h e h i g h e r
the number of members in the community the greater their entry value.
In other words, an idle migrant would maximise his/her entry option by
p r e t e n d i n ga l w a y st ob et h el a s tt om i g r a t e .I nf a c tam i g r a n tt h a tp r e t e n d s
t ob et h el a s tt oe n t e re x p e c t sa ni n a d m i s s i b l eu p w a r dj u m pi nb e n e ﬁts
following the policy θ
∗(n). To see this, consider an individual that pretends
to have been the last to enter at θ = θ












β1 (ρ − α)
> 0 (30)
This contradicts the smooth pasting condition Vθ(n,θ
∗(n)) = 0 a n dt h e nt h e
optimality of θ
∗(n).
To verify that the necessary conditions are satisﬁed, let us calculate the
value of an (incumbent) immigrant in the host country starting at the point
(n,θ), that would follow a policy deﬁned by two parameters: wait until the
ﬁrst instant T at which the process θ rises to a level c>θ ,corresponding to
an immediate increase in the community size to b>n .Making use of (24)























47See Moretto (2003) for a conjecture of how this can be proved.
34If each individual were able to choose the best moment for the community’s





























When b and c are chosen according to the candidate policy so that b = n
and c = θ
∗(n) the value function reduces to (20) and the matching value
condition requires V (b,c)=K. These properties verify that the candidate
policy satisﬁes these conditions.
Let the immigrant, as in (31), wait until the ﬁrst time the process θ rises
to the trigger level c ≡ θ
∗(b), corresponding to an immediate increase of the
network size to b>n ,and assume also that he/she expects no more entry
after b. Therefore the expected payoﬀ V (b,θ) from this time onwards equals





Comparing (32) with (20) gives A1(b)=0 . Therefore to obtain the constant
A1(n), subject to the claim that beyond b no other immigrants will enter,
we substitute (20) into the condition Vn(n,θ






































35Substituting (34) into (20), which we rewrite to make its dependence explicit














As long as u(b) >u (n) the ﬁrst term in (35) is positive and it forecasts
the advantage the immigrant would experience by the entry of b − n new
immigrants when θ hits θ
∗(b). T h a ti s ,i fh e / s h ew e r ea b l et oc h o o s et h e
optimal dimension of the jump, it would be b → ¯ n which happens the ﬁrst
time that θ reaches θ
∗(¯ n). Thus, as opposed to before non-sequential entry are
possibile, the necessary conditions would coordinate an optimal simultaneous
entry by ¯ n−n new immigrants. If u00(n) < 0 the necessary conditions are also
suﬃcients. Furthermore, substituting (35) into the extended smooth pasting

















The term inside square brackets is always positive (i.e. there is no value
n◦ ∈ (n, ¯ n) that makes it nil), and (36) holds with dθ∗
dn =0 .T h a t i s , a l l
immigrants in the range (n, ¯ n) must enter at θ = θ
∗(¯ n).
In other words, as the stochastic process θ is common knowledge, each
immigrant can foresee the beneﬁt from the entry of others and observing the
realization of the state variable θ instantaneously considers when to enter
by maximizing (35). Then, with simultanous entry, the immigrants’ optimal
strategies are easy to ﬁnd: each individual entersa si fh e / s h ew e r et h eo n l y
person to enter but with the expectation of earning all the network beneﬁts,
i.e. θ
∗(¯ n) is a (symmetric) Pareto-dominant Nash equilibrium for all n<¯ n
(see Moretto 2003). In addition, as the reaction lags are literally nonexistent,
none have the incentive to deviate from the entry strategy θ → θ
∗(¯ n) and
b → ¯ n given that the others do not deviate. Finally, since θ is a Markov
process in levels (Harrison, 1985, p.5-6), the conditional expectation (31) is
in fact a function solely of the starting states so that, at each date t>0,
the immigrant’s values resemble those described in (35) which makes the
equilibrium subgame perfect.
Finally, we can to deal with the general case (quadrant I and II in Figure
3). If n ∈ (n0,n”) we need ﬁrst to ﬁnd a network size n◦ such that u(n)=
36u(n◦) with u0(n◦) > 0 and then to perform the same policy as in (35) or (36).
That is, the optimal entry would be of (¯ n − n◦)+( n◦ − n) immigrants the
ﬁrst time that θ reaches θ
∗(¯ n).
37BT a b l e s
 
Parameter Description  Symbol  Source 
Discount rate    ρ1=0,03 
ρ1=0,05 
Nordhaus (1996) 




Borjas (1990); De New and  Zimmermann (1997)  
Borjas (1994); Bauer (1997) 
Wage diferential  φi=(1-w
o/w)  φi  World Bank 





i  World Bank 
Chiswick (1978) 
Borjas (1990) 






i  φi 
Albania 0,639  29/33 
China 0,649  8/9 
Philippines 0,593  5/6 
Romania 0,510  3/4 
 
Table 3: φi and φ
0
i calibration
  Albania China Philippines  Romania 
σ1  0,063 0,061  0,057 0,047 
σ2  0,055 0,055  0,056 0,054 
b  0,973 0,850  0,648 0,828 
a  0,110 0,117  0,141 0,123 
m  0,274 0,138  0,256 0,115 
 
Table 4: The Bass parameters for 1996, 1997 and 1998
38Parameters θ
*   n’/m  n’  n
*/m n
* n,  1997 
   Albania     
0,05; -0,2  83,95 0,008 2275  0,33 91000  101634 
0,05; -0,02  12,48 0,000  0  0,42 115150   
0,03; -0,2  22,56 0,004 1225  0,35 96600   
0,03; -0,02  3,33 0,000  0  0,43  118300   
   China     
0,05; -0,2  77,51 0,017 2375  0,30 42000  55352 
0,05; -0,02  13,26 0,000  0  0,41 56000   
0,03; -0,2  20,97 0,008 1125  0,33 45500   
0,03; -0,02  3,55 0,000  0  0,42 58000   
   Philippines     
0,05; -0,2  98,81 0,000  0  0,10 25900  93837 
0,05; -0,02  16,19 0,000  0  0,36 91700   
0,03; -0,2  27,58 0,066 16975 0,23 59850   
0,03; -0,02  4,38 0,000  0  0,38 96250   
   Romania     
0,05; -0,2  85,85 0,023 2625  0,29 34000  44413 
0,05; -0,02  15,73 0,000  0  0,40 46250   
0,03; -0,2  23,17 0,012 1375  0,32 37000   
0,03; -0,02  4,21 0,000  0  0,41 47750   
 
Table 5: Main results
where:
• parameters: are respectively the discount factors (i.e. ρ1 =0 ,05; ρ2 =
0,03) and the elasticity levels (i.e. ζ1 = −0,2; ζ2 = −0,02);
• θ
∗: represents the optimal trigger level at which the migration wave
starts;
• n’/m: is the critical level that “triggers”t h en e t w o r ke ﬀect as a per-
centage of the saturation dimension m;
• n∗/m: is the optimal dimension of the community in percentage of the
theoretic maximum dimension m;
• n∗: is the level of the community that triggers the migration ﬂow;
• n_year (i.e. n_1997) is the empirical jump observed in our data (see
ﬁgure 1).
39K
* Albania China Philippines Romania
ρ1 = 0,05 1,29 1,21 1,00 1,01
ρ2 = 0,03 1,30 1,22 1,00 1,02







Table 7: Caritas report. Number of residents per million of inhabitants,
2004.
t1 Albania China Philippines Romania
b 0,991 0,883 0,652 0,835
a 0,097 0,103 0,137 0,108
m 0,312 0,157 0,262 0,132
Table 8: The Bass parameters for 1996, 1997 and 1999
t2 Albania China Philippines Romania
b 1,194 1,077 0,667 0,952
a 0,073 0,086 0,122 0,059
m 0,412 0,189 0,294 0,242
Table 9: The Bass parameters for 1996, 1997 and 2000
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